monell v department of social servicesmonell v department of social services

Second, the bill provided that the action would be against the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and that it could be maintained by either the person injured or his legal representative. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548; App., in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. Globe 777 (Sen. Frelinghuysen). 1343, even though the existence of a meritorious constitutional claim is not similarly required in order to invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. . 1983, and particularly the rejection of the so-called Sherman amendmen , the Court held that Congress in 1871 doubted its constitutional authority to impose civil liability on municipalities and therefore could not have intended to include municipal bodies within the class of "persons" subject to the Act. We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or against municipal liability. See also T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *483-*484 (1871 ed.). But Monroe exempted local governments from liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse door to suits against officers and employees of those entitieseven when they act pursuant to express authorization. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. V). See 18 F., at 394. with intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude . (Emphasis added.). [was] perhaps not premised on considered holdings." See Duncan, supra, at 174-176, 88 S.Ct. 320. Of a l its recent enactments, only the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 2, 90 Stat. . Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. That is the premise of the canon of interpretation that language in a decision not necessary to the holding may be accorded less weight in subsequent cases. In these circumstances, it cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its prior holdings. If the Government of the United States can step in and add to those obligations, may it not utterly destroy the municipality? 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. The defendants were the Department of Social Services and its Com-missioner, the Board of Education and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its Mayor. 86 (1869), the Letson principle was automatically and without discussion extended to municipal corporations. Police Misconduct - Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 The complete text of the first conference substitute for the Sherman amendment is: "That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered in an action on the case by such person or his representative in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was committed, such action to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish, and in which action any of the parties committing such acts may be joined as defendants. 1601(a) (1976 ed. [1] Additionally, the Court held that 1983 claims against municipal entities must be based on implementation of a policy or custom. Private parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated holdings of this Court without being obliged to peruse the briefs of the litigants to predict the likelihood that this Court might change its mind. Pp. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).8 Moreover the rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed to avoid closing all avenues under 1983 to injunctive relief against constitutional violations by local government. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The opposition in the House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on municipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Monell v. DEPARTMENT OF SOC. SERVS. OF CITY OF NY, 394 F. Supp. 853 (S Named as defendants in the action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. SERVS. . Nor is this the usual case in which the Court is asked to overrule a precedent. Cong. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 Geo.L.J. [14], In her brief for certiorari, Monell argued that (1) a school board is a "person" within the meaning of 1983; (2) an official withholding wages in violation of the constitution can be compelled to provide back pay under 1983; (3) a district court can award monetary relief in a 1983 action for injury sustained between filing the complaint and the granting of final injunctive relief. The House finished its initial debates on H.R. In Monroe and its progeny, we have answered a question that was never actually briefed or argued in this Courtwhether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that are the direct result of its official policies. While it undoubtedly has more latitude in the field of constitutional interpretation, this Court is surely not free to abandon settled statutory interpretation at any time a new thought seems appealing.3. Thus, in Trumbull's view the word "may" meant "shall." 13-14. . 31 (1827). There is no suggestion in the opinions, however, that the practices at issue were anything other than official, duly authorized policies. And on numerous subsequent occasions, the Court has been required to apply the full breadth of the Marbury holding. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1671, 51 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demanding State] when he shall appear . 278. Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law."56. The Court examined the vote on Section 1 of 1983, (2) the Sherman Amendment and its vote, (3) the text and vote on the first conference report, and (4) the text and vote on the second conference report. 595, 83 L.Ed. 2749, 2762, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 347-348, 25 L.Ed. First, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I am satisfied that no such showing has been made. See id., at 664-665. the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . To obliterate those legitimate expectations without more compelling justifications than those advanced by the Court is a significant departure from our prior practice. Nevertheless, no state court had ever held that municipal corporations were always liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons. 197 (1880) (recognizing principle that public property of a municipality was not subject o execution); 2 J. Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations 445-446 (1873 ed.) Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. IVthe Act of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 10,336) (CC ND Ill.1873); 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 2 *278-*279 (12th O. W. Holmes ed. 394 F.Supp. (1973); S. 179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 2(a) (1973); H.R. In considering the effect of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, in Monroe, however, Mr. Justice Douglas, apparently focusing on the word "may," stated: "[T]his definition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." . to Civil Rights Act liability through no action of its own and based on action contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state it is a part of." 436 U. S. 695-696. Other bills designed either completely to remove the federal courts from the school desegregation controversy, S. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. Thus, while we have reaffirmed Monroe without further examination on three occasions,61 it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be beyond question. . [2], The case began in July 1971 as a challenge to the New York City Board of Education's forced maternity leave policies. And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. But other proponents of the amendment apparently viewed it as a form of vicarious liability for the unlawful acts of the citizens of the locality. Since Parts II and IV of the opinion of the Court are merely advisory and are not necessary to explain the Court's decision, I join only Parts I, III, and V. Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. [18] In its reply brief against certiorari, the City argued that retroactive application of Title VII to allow damages would "operate unjustly" and that their maternity leave policies were "adopted with the most laudatory motives" to "protect women employees and their unborn children", no matter "how unreasonable or arbitrary they might seem by today's rapidly evolving standards". The primary constitutional justification for the Sherman amendment was that it was a necessary and proper remedy for the failure of localities to protect citizens as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required. Today the Court recognizes that this principle also applies to a local government when implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury. For example, 211 of the Act, 88 Stat. . Had Mr. Justice McLean been correct in his suggestion that, where the Constitution envisioned affirmative government assistance, the States or their officers or instrumentalities could be required to provide it, there would have been little doubt that Congress could have insisted that municipalities afford by "positive" action the protection34 owed individuals under 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment whether or not municipalities were obligated by state law to keep the peace. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). 230, 4 Wash.C.C. Jane MONELL et al., Petitioners,v.DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF the CITY OF NEW YORK et al. [24] The same standard of deliberate indifference applies to failure to screen employees. See supra, at 668. It must be remembered that the same Court which rendered Day also vigorously enforced the Contract Clause against municipalitiesan enforcement effort which included various forms of "positive" relief, such as ordering that taxes be levied and collected to discharge federal-court judgments, once a constitutional infraction was found.40 Thus, federal judicial enforcement of the Constitution's express limits on state power, since it was done so frequently, must, notwithstanding anything said in Dennison or Day, have been permissible, at least so long as the interpretation of the Constitution was left in the hands of the judiciary. decided [in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. See 100 U.S., at 345-348. 1368 (1941)] and Screws [v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978) (plurality opinion); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396, 27 S.Ct. 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdiction6we indicated in Mt. . . Because I cannot agree that this Court is "free to disregard these precedents," which have been "considered maturely and recently" by this Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186, 96 S.Ct. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, supra, 414 U.S., at 636, 94 S.Ct., at 792; App., in Keyes v. School District No. So long as federal courts were vindicating the Federal Constitution, they were providing the "positive" government action required to protect federal constitutional rights and no question was raised of enlisting the States in "positive" action. 42 U.S.C. 1983-Civil Rights-Municipalities Liable for Money Damages 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board of Education, 397 U.S. 232, 90 S.Ct. Social Work Services and Behavioral Health . Congress thus clearly recognized that school boards were often parties to federal school desegregation suits. Congress did not respond by declaring that sc ool boards were not subject to suit under 1983 or any other federal statute, "but simply [legislated] revised evidentiary standards and remedial priorities to be employed by the courts in deciding such cases." and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Federal Civil Rights Acts (3d ed. 60 (1803), forward, in which the explicit ground of decision "was never actually briefed or argued," ante, at 708 (POWELL, J., concurring), would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1956 (T. Cooley ed. 535, 18 L.Ed. Jane MONELL et al., Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF the CITY OF NEW YORK et al. And he agreed that the bill "secure[d] the rights of white men as much as of colored men." PDF Plaintiff, v. - United States Courts 1159, 1161 (ED Va.1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (CA4 1973), rev'd and remanded, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Board had a policy of requiring women to take maternity leave after the seventh month of pregnancy unless that month fell in the last month of the school year, in which case the teacher could remain through the end of the school term. . We have attempted only to sketch so much of the 1983 cause of action against a local government as is apparent from the history of the 1871 Act and our prior cases, and we expressly leave further development of this action to another day. 436 U. S. 691-695. . 299 (1866) (following Coryell ), one of three State Supreme Court cases referred to in Globe App. 2641, 42 U.S.C. . Powell noted that the considerations of stare decisis operated in both directions in this case, and that this case was different than the usual case where the Court is asked to overrule a precedent, reasoning that on the one hand, there are cases ruling that municipal entities are not "persons" under the statute, but on the other hand cases holding school boards liable. Opinion Announcement - June 06, 1978. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of municipal liability remained one of respondeat superior. 141, 100 L.Ed. 1706, 1708, 1710, 1718 (1976 ed.). . . ; 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts, 26.3, pp. Id., at 615. (d) Finally, it appears beyond doubt from the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that Monroe misapprehended the meaning of the Act. Second, the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no limit on the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitution against municipalities that violated it. See, e. g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 1 Wall. can establish what is state law. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 789 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in tort: "Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and no property can be found to levy upon except the courthouse, can we levy on the courthouse and sell it? 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. (Emphasis added.). That approach, however, would create tension with Kenosha because it would require "a bifurcated application" of "the generic word 'person' in 1983" to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." 436 U. S. 690-691. In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. 1084 (1946). Globe 795. 732 (1870). . (1970 ed. 302the constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 84 (emphasis added). such persons." . Cf. Jan 25, 1977 Advocates Oscar Chase for petitioners L. Kevin Sheridan for respondents Facts of the case The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 927 (1939)and no other constitutional formula was advanced by participants in the House debates. 815 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). 320 were therefore sent to a conference committee. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703, 97 S.Ct. There, the Court was asked to require Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand over Lago, a fugitive from justice wanted in Kentucky, as required by 1 of the Act of Feb. 12, 1793,35 which implemented Art. Instead, Congress must have intended the definitions of the Act to apply across-the-board except where the Act by its terms called for a deviation from this practice"[where] the context shows that [defined] words were to be used in a more limited sense." . See Globe 805 (exchange between Rep. Willard and Rep. Shellabarger). Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291, 97 S.Ct. 1617 (1976 ed. at 485 (emphasis added), quoting Globe 804 (Rep. Poland). 39, pp. [4] The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning of 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities.